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Summary  
This report contains the results of a workshop held 2-3 June 2003 in Amsterdam as part 
of the first phase of the project entitled “Helping Operationalise article Two (HOT): A 
science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways to avoid dangerous interference 
with the climate system and implications for Post-Kyoto policies”. The HOT project 
concerns a science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways to avoid dangerous 
interference with the climate system and implications for Post-Kyoto policies. The work-
shop, aimed at policy makers and stakeholders from industrialised countries (Annex I) 
only, was part of a series of regional scooping meetings in Asia, Latin America, Africa 
and Europe during the first preparatory phase of the HOT project (January –September 
2003). The purpose of this meeting was to discuss and elaborate on the content of Article 
2 of the Climate Change Convention and collect ideas within Annex I regarding ways to 
operationalise Article 2 and the design of a follow up of the dialogue on the global level. 
The workshop revealed differences in perceptions but also a great interest in continuing 
the dialogue in a second phase of the HOT project. 
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1. Introduction 
This report contains the results of a workshop held 2-3 June 2003 in Amsterdam as part 
of the first phase of the programme entitled “Helping Operationalise article Two (HOT): 
A science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways to avoid dangerous interfer-
ence with the climate system and implications for Post-Kyoto policies”. The HOT pro-
ject concerns a science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways to avoid dan-
gerous interference with the climate system and implications for Post-Kyoto policies. 
The workshop, aimed at policy makers and stakeholders from industrialised countries 
(Annex I) only, was part of a series of regional scooping meetings in Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, Africa and Europe during the first preparatory phase of the HOT project (January –
September 2003). The purpose of this meeting was to discuss and elaborate on the con-
tent of Article 2 of the Climate Change Convention and collect ideas within Annex I re-
garding ways to operationalise Article 2 and the design of a follow up of the dialogue on 
the global level. 
1.1 Background of the workshop: The HOT project and its objectives 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes (UNFCCC) 
was signed. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is formulated in Article 2: 
“(…)to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, the stabi-
lization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should 
be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to cli-
mate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
After the entering into force of the UNFCCC, the policy discussions soon focussed on 
the need for short-term actions. This resulted in 1997 in the adoption of the Kyoto Proto-
col. With the Protocol global society has made a first, but small step towards the attain-
ment of the ultimate goal of the Climate Convention. In order to attain a stabilisation of 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, (GHGs), emissions will have to be 
strongly reduced in the long term. The level at which the concentrations of GHGs are 
eventually stabilised determines the overall level of global climate change. At the same 
time, the level of climate change and the severity of its impacts are highly uncertain, par-
ticularly at the regional level. Moreover, defining what constitutes a ‘dangerous’ level of 
climate change inevitably involves value-loaded choices related to acceptable risks of 
climate change and of climate change policies that cannot be resolved by scientific in-
quiry only. Therefore there is a need for dialogue amongst policymakers and stake-
holders about acceptable and unacceptable climate change impacts, about fair ways of 
dealing with the unequal distribution of impacts, and about options for a fair distribution 
of emission control and adaptation costs.  
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiations on new commitments for the second 
commitment period (2013-2017) should start by 2005. This again will raise the question 
what the overall level of stringency of mitigation commitments should be. Given the 
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large inertia in the climate system near-term action should be related to long-term cli-
mate policy goals in order to avoid closing off some long-term policy options (Berk et al, 
2001). 
For these reasons the HOT project was initiated. The purpose of the HOT project is to 
help better articulate and operationalise the ultimate objective of the Climate Change 
Convention as stated in Article 2 in specific terms on the basis of a science-based policy 
dialogue, providing support to future policy debates on the need for new near action.  
The aims of the HOT project are to: 
• facilitate a scientifically well-informed dialogue amongst climate change policy 
stakeholders to help define what would constitute “dangerous interference with the 
climate system” as covered by Article 2 of the FCCC; 
• improve insights in differences of perspectives for building consensus towards policy 
action;  
• provide insights into options for fair and effective post-Kyoto global climate change 
regimes for mitigation, impacts and adaptation, and 
• link the debate on medium-term (post 2012) climate policy targets to long-term per-
spectives on effective and fair climate change impact control and sustainable devel-
opment. 
As such a global policy dialogue is a complex, time-intensive and costly process, it was 
felt that a preparatory phase would be needed. For this phase funding was obtained from 
the Dutch Ministry of Environment. For the actual dialogue more funding options would 
be explored. This would require a well-elaborated project plan based on insights gained 
from the preparatory phase. The objectives of this first phase of the project therefore 
were:  
• to identify the possible participants in such a dialogue and to secure their commit-
ment to the project; 
• to come to a common problem definition, dialogue agenda and methodology that 
will allow for effective and fair participation of all participants in the dialogue; 
• to prepare a detailed project proposal for the dialogue phase, and; 
• to generate support amongst the policy and funding community for such a dialogue.  
As part of the preparatory phase a series of dialogues would be organised in different 
regions of the world on Article 2. These workshops would be organised by the regional 
project partners: for Africa ENDA-Tiers Monde in Senegal, for Asia the The Energy and 
Resources Institute in New Delhi and for Latin America COPPE in Brazil. In preparing 
for the dialogue, a first round of questionnaires was sent out to stakeholders in the region 
to gather their perspectives on the issue. Next participants would be selected and asked 
to elaborate their personal views on the Article. These views together with the results of 
the questionnaires would be used as input for regional workshops.  
The outcomes of the regional workshops will be integrated in the preparation for a global 
dialogue. Participants in the global dialogue will then return to their regions to discuss 
the issues at regional level. This is envisaged to lead to a new set of regional dialogues, 
followed by a global dialogue and one more round of regional dialogues. 
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1.2 Objectives and design of the HOT workshop 
The objectives of the Annex 1 workshop were to: 
• make a start with exchanging views on Art. 2 in order to increase mutual understand-
ing of different perspectives; 
• make a start with defining criteria for assessing dangerous levels of climate change 
impacts, and;  
• get advice on the contents and set up a global dialogue on Art. 2 in the second phase 
of the HOT project. 
The workshop was set up as a one-day “around the clock” workshop, starting in the late 
afternoon and ending around the same time the next day (see for the programme Annex 
I). Regarding its design, the workshop reserved much room for input from participants to 
enhance their involvement. For this reason, after some introductions by the project team, 
the programme started with the presentation by two participants of their views on Article 
2 and also included smaller outbreak groups the next day for more intensive interactions. 
The design also gave priority to the views and ideas of the participants instead of to the 
input of scientists. Their input was scheduled for the next day.  
With respect to the input of scientific information a limited number of scientists were 
invited, covering various fields of expertise relevant for the elaboration of Article 2, 
including physics, ecology, economics, social and ethical issues, and development 
issues. Most experts were given short slots for presenting their views, in addition to an 
overall introduction by the Tyndall Centre on the contribution of science to the 
elaboration of Article 2. Moreover, the scientists normally participated in the 
discussions. 
While the HOT project itself addresses a much wider set of issues - including costs and 
opportunities for mitigation and adaptation and the implications of long-term climate 
change targets for near term-policy making - the focus of the preparatory Annex I 
workshop was mainly on general perceptions of Article 2 and on views about appropriate 
indicators for defining dangerous climatic change. This choice was made to limit the 
complexity of the discussions and because the other issues were considered to be part of 
next steps in the eventual dialogue. It also allowed the participants to spend considerable 
time in breakout groups to discuss possible indicators for defining dangerous climate 
change.  
At the end of the workshop, time was reserved for discussing ideas for a follow up of the 
workshop during the second phase of the HOT project. 
1.3 Introduction to the workshop (1): some theoretical perspectives 1 
The meeting began with an introduction by Joyeeta Gupta. She began with the frog 
metaphor. A frog put into boiling water will jump out. A frog put in water which is then 
put to boil might get used to the gradual heating process, may become numbed by the 
process and may not be able to jump out in time. The global population is in the situation 
of the frog in the latter situation. She submitted further that in the global negotiating 
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process, it is often very difficult for countries negotiating their national interests to actu-
ally reach problem solving. In fact, realists predict that problem solving will be impossi-
ble. Institutionalists however see that there may be some space for problem solving in 
such complex issues by bypassing the truly difficult issues and by trying to focus on 
those issues where simple solutions present themselves. This is why, she argued, there is 
a climate convention, but no clear articulation of its long-term goals. In fact, negotiation 
is not necessarily the appropriate tool to reach a better understanding of the issues in-
volved in climate change. Nor can research per se develop an adequate approach. The 
only way to deal with an issue where the science is so uncertain, the problem asymmetri-
cal in its effects and where the values differ from country to country is to have a global 
dialogue on the issue. 
A dialogue is not negotiation, nor does it substitute for negotiation. Outcomes of the dia-
logue will not be used to force negotiation outcomes. It is meant to enrich understanding 
if each other’s perspectives and to seek common ground and to learn to be able to live 
with the differences. Why is a dialogue necessary? The Two Cultures theory developed 
in 1964 postulated that there is a vast difference between the academic culture and the 
policy culture. The academic culture is slow, focused on complexity and especially on 
theoretical complexity, inward looking, and aims at reviewed publications. The policy 
culture is different. Policymakers look for fast, simple solutions to policy problems that 
are easy to sell to others; they never read reviewed journals and focus on practice. Forty 
years later, we are not just talking about two conflicting cultures that cannot easily com-
municate with each other. Scientists are only one source of information, other profes-
sional communities have their own professional cultures, people have their own cultures, 
and cultures vary within and between nations and blocs. All this leads to a pluralistic, 
multinational culture conflict.  
In complex issues, the question is: can scientists provide unbiased and objective informa-
tion? They tend to think so; and often there are strong vested interests in each discipline 
to keep the discipline pure. Political scientists either argue that there is a strong fact 
value dichotomy, or they argue that science itself is highly value laden and its claim to 
objectivity cannot be accepted without proof.  
How do policy makers then use this science? The Two Cultures theory argued that it 
could frequently not be used since it is not user friendly. Normativists argue that knowl-
edge is used in the public interest. Rational actors modellers believe that knowledge is 
only used if it conforms to the interests, intuitions and beliefs of the policy maker. Public 
choice theorists argue that knowledge is only used if it conforms to the private interests 
of the policymaker. Critical theory argues that policy is the outcome of politics, not ex-
pertise. These theories have developed mostly within the context of domestic science-
policy interface. At international level, we see a slight difference of perspective. For the 
neo-realist science does not have an independent influence on policymaking. For the his-
torical materialist, if science has an influence it will not be in the interests of the South. 
For the neo-institutionalist, science has an independent influence especially in benign is-
sue areas. For the idealistic supranationalist science should focus on global interests and 
be adopted by global institutions. For the cognitivist, science influences scientific and 
policy communities through networking and can have thus a much stronger influence.  
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What the above shows is that science is not seen as the only source of information for 
decision-making, nor is it seen as providing the objective knowledge necessary for 
global decision-making. Policymakers too are influenced by a number of factors in mak-
ing their decisions. Given that the problem of climate change is asymmetric in nature, 
that is that all countries will face vastly different types of impacts from the problem, it is 
more than likely that the issues facing these countries will be very different. Policymak-
ers may find it extremely difficult to reach problem solving unless they engage in a con-
structive dialogue to understand what the different parties think.  
In fact a dialogue is necessary when the science and values in a problem are highly con-
troversial; when the issue is highly politicised and contemporary; when potential solu-
tions are not immediately visible, feasible or acceptable, when the stakes are high and 
decisions urgent, when the effects are remote in time and space, when the impacts vary 
considerably between the centre (developed countries) and the periphery (developing 
countries).  
Dialogues are in fact becoming increasingly common these days. Many of these are be-
ing initiated by the policy community. Thus we have the dialogues initiated by the World 
Water Forum, the Water and Climate Dialogues and the dialogues of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development. We have also some science-initiated dialogues such as the 
COOL Project (Climate Options in the Long Term).  
The purpose of the dialogue is to provide a non-confrontational setting for an informed 
discussion. Participants do not represent national or other interests, their opinions will 
not be cited out of context, nor will they bound by any of the outcomes of the dialogue. 
The main product of the dialogue is the dialogue itself and the accelerated learning proc-
ess that is hoped is thereby initiated. There is no need to reach consensus; the only real 
measure of success is that the process reaches a situation when people understand the 
perspectives of others and learn to respect them, even if they cannot accept them.  
1.4 Introduction to the workshop (2): Some introductory comments on 
Article 22 
Following this theoretical introduction, Bert Metz presented some background informa-
tion on the background of the HOT project and the key issues that need to be kept in 
mind in articulating Article 2. 
He started with reviewing the various elements of Article 2. He stressed that Article 2 
not only refers to the risks of climate change for ecosystems and food production, but 
also to the risks related to climate policies. These policies should also enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. This means that a balance is sought be-
tween the risks of climate change and implications of climate policies. With respect to 
the risks of climate change he used the colouring scheme from IPCC’s Third Assessment 
Report (TAR) (see Figure 1.1), in which the knowledge about the risks of climate change 
has been summarised according to 5 different reasons for concern: 
1. Risks to unique and threatened systems, (e.g. coral reefs); 
2. Risk from extreme climate events (e.g. heat waves and storms); 
                                                   
2  By Bert Metz, RIVM. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 6
3. Distribution of impacts (e.g. more negative impacts in developing countries); 
4. Aggregated impacts (e.g. for economic sectors); 
5. Risks of large-scale discontinuities (e.g. ocean circulation). 
With increasing magnitude of climate change, more and more systems are expected to be 
dominantly negatively affected. Already limited temperature changes as experienced to-
day may, for example, threaten the existence and functioning of many unique systems, 
like mountain ecosystems or coral reefs. The EU has set as its long-term climate target to 
limit global average temperature change to less than 2 °C compared to pre-industrial lev-
els, which is less than 1.5°C from 1990 levels. The figure from the IPCC indicates that 
this target poses already significant risks to unique and threatened systems, results in in-
creased risks from extreme climate events. On the other hand, the risks of large-scale 
discontinuities seem to remain low as it only increases if the temperature rises more than 
2 - 3 °C compared to 1990 levels.  
1 2 3 4 5
Risks to unique &
threatened systemsRisks to some Risks to many
Increase Large increase Risk of extremeweather events
Distribution
of impacts
Negative for
some regions
Negative for
most regions
Aggregate impactsNet negative in all metricsPositive or negative monetary;majority of people adversely affected
Past Future
0-0.7
Increase in global mean temperature after 1990 (°C)
Very low Higher Risks of large-scalesingularities
 
Figure 1.1 Climate change risks (source: IPCC-TAR, 2001). 
He next discussed the relationship between the global average temperature change and 
levels of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions. This relationship is still very uncertain 
due to the uncertainties in the sensitivity of the climate system. The higher the level of 
stabilisation the larger the difference between the level of warming in 2100 and the equi-
librium temperature change on the very long term. He highlighted that if the climate sen-
sitivity is high even a stabilisation of the CO2 concentration at 450ppmv may not be suf-
ficient to avoid exceeding the 2°C level on the long-term. He continued with indicating 
the implications of the various stabilisation levels for CO2 for the allowable emissions 
pathways during this century. According to the IPCC, stabilisation at 450ppmv would 
require that global CO2 emissions would have to peak before 2015 and that thus waiting 
with mitigating greenhouse gas emissions may foreclose certain policy options. The im-
portance of timely action is also related to the large inertia in both climate and human 
systems. Even after stabilising GHG concentrations sea level rise will continue for centu-
ries to millennia before equilibrium is attained. The long life times of a major part of the 
capital stock (like power stations) implies that timely adjustments are needed to avoid 
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high costs due to the need for premature crapping of existing capital. Metz pointed out 
that the climate change problem is essentially a risk problem where decision-making un-
der large uncertainty inevitable. It requires a sequential decision making process where 
no final decisions can be taken, but where options open should be kept open by a hedg-
ing strategy and policies should be adjusted overtime according to improving insights in 
the risks of policy options. In exploring the implications of Article 2 he suggested the 
use of the so-called SAFE concept, containing the various elements that should be ex-
plored in an iterative way for finding solutions for Art.2: ecologically Safe, politically 
Acceptable, technically Feasible, and economically Efficient. He finished his presenta-
tion with explaining the objectives of the meeting and its programme.
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2. Stakeholders perceptions on Article 2 
2.1 Perceptions on Article 2: results from a survey 3 
Marcel Berk presented some preliminary results of the stakeholders’ questionnaire on 
Article 2 of the Climate Convention. The questionnaire consisted of mainly open ques-
tions and was sent out to approximately 300 people (policy makers / stakeholders in 
UNFCCC, OECD and EU circles, scientists involved in IPCC). 36 filled out question-
naires had been returned. Some represented views of an organisation or group of per-
sons. Most responses were from scientists (16) and policy makers (14); the number of re-
sponses from NGOs was limited (5), while there was hardly any response from business 
(1). However, the number of people from industry approached was also relatively small. 
With respect to the geographical representation most responses were from Western 
Europe (18), followed by North America (7) and other OECD countries (7). There were 
hardly responses from Economies in Transition (1). Some responses came from persons 
working for International Organisations (3). The responses thus showed an under-
representation of views from business, EIT and the USA.  
The first question related to the adequacy of the wording of Article 2. Many people think 
Art. 2 is not adequately formulated or misses important elements for guiding climate 
policies. Some arguments mentioned include: 
• (induced) climate change is already dangerous; goal is to minimise; 
• goal should be stabilisation of temperature instead of concentrations; 
• conditions formulated too vaguely; too much a diplomatic compromise; 
• there is not enough attention for rate of change, irreversible impacts, human health 
and distributional and scale aspects. 
Others noted that the specific conditions mentioned should not be considered inclusive 
as the first part of Art. 2 is much more general. From the responses it also became clear 
that the wording of Article 2 is ambiguous. In particular the phrase “to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner” can be interpreted in different ways: as 
sustainable development or as sustained economic growth.  
A second question was when people considered the conditions mentioned in Article 2 no 
longer to be met. This question posed problems to some people because of the unclear 
interpretation of Article 2. Some people said that the conditions of Art. 2 to some extent 
are already no longer met (e.g. vulnerable ecosystems). NGOs indicated that the condi-
tions would no longer be met when temperature increases more than 2 degrees above 
pre-industrial levels.  
Conditions often mentioned included: 
• in case of disruption of West Antarctic Ice Sheet, melting of Greenland, change in 
ocean currents, modification of regional weather systems (e.g. rain seasons); 
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• in case of extensive/irreversible damage to ecosystems (loss of species); severe bush 
fires become commonplace, the biosphere starts releasing carbon; 
• when food production/habitats being threatened in various regions/countries due to 
climate change intensified droughts and/or flooding; 
• when island states injure severe damage or become inhabitable due to climate 
change; 
• when climate change results in significant loss of health, economic security/welfare; 
• when climate change policies impair development goals. 
Someone pointed out that the conditions related more to risks of impacts than to the ac-
tual state of affairs, since in that case it would already be too late to take action.   
In response to the question at what levels (of scale) Article 2 should be assessed, most 
people indicated that it should be assessed at all scales. Some said that equity considera-
tions implied that it should mainly be evaluated at the local scale. Some others believed 
it should only be assessed at a regional/global scale. They indicated that it would be im-
possible to protect all local ecosystems and food production either because of already in-
duced climate change or because it would be a too stringent criterion. Some mentioned 
that the appropriate scale also depended on types of risks (e.g. risks to ecosystems: local-
regional; risks to food production: regional-global; risks from disruption of climate sys-
tem/ocean currents: global). Appropriate scales would be rather bio-geographical units 
(ecosystems) or socio-cultural units (e.g. indigenous groups) than administrative units 
(like countries). Many people found it difficult to indicate priorities, either because all 
conditions were considered important or because they were considered interlinked and/or 
scale/situation dependent (e.g. depending on the most critical condition). A number of 
people, if needed, would give priority to ecosystems because of the lack of options for 
adaptation and the possible irreversible nature of impacts. Generally, food production 
was considered a high priority, but intrinsically linked with sustainable development. 
Some gave it less priority at a local scale as food security could be attained via redistri-
bution and trade. Some respondents gave a low priority to the economic conditions, not-
ing that not all economic activities can be considered sustainable and may be substituted 
by other activities.  
A fifth question concerned unacceptable outcomes of climate change policies. Outcomes 
referred to by a number of people include:  
• no significant emission reductions; 
• main polluters not participating in taking action;  
• increasing the N-S welfare gap and poverty in developing countries; 
• policies that do not allocate costs and benefits in an equitable manner; and  
• policies that do not take national circumstances into account. 
Other outcomes mentioned were the destruction and depopulation of small island states, 
policies resulting into large number of environmental refugees, policies resulting in irre-
versible impacts (e.g. loss of species, habitat/culture), policies ignoring the risk of high 
impact - low probability events, policies discouraging/impairing economic growth and 
putting an unreasonable burden on civil society, and policies leaving future generation 
with unmanageable risks and costs.  
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A sixth question related to the distribution of costs of mitigation and adaptation. Some 
misinterpreted this question as prioritising funds for mitigation or adaptation instead of 
the allocation of costs among countries. Many people referred to the principle in art. 3.1 
UNFCCC of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and proposed to share mitiga-
tion costs proportional to emissions (polluter pays principle) and ability to pay and to re-
spect development needs of developing countries. Other burden sharing criteria men-
tioned include: historic/future contribution to warming, per capita emission allocations, 
mitigation capabilities, and willingness to pay. Some suggest a balance between various 
equity principles. Regarding adaptation costs many feel that these should be born nation-
ally, but with (substantial) relief for the least developed countries. Some said those bene-
fiting from climate change should not be exempted from neither taking action nor being 
compensated.  
A next question concerned controversies to be expected when discussing Article 2. Here 
items often referred to included: 
• lack of consensus on defining criteria for “dangerous interference”; 
• differences about proper scale of assessing “dangerous interference”; 
• valuation of non-monetary impacts (ecosystems, culture) versus monetary impacts; 
• lack of consensus on the concept of sustainable development and its priorities (food 
versus nature); 
• differences about dealing with risks/scientific uncertainty (e.g. attribution of negative 
changes to (anthropogenic) climate change); 
• differences about feasible and acceptable levels of adaptation and mitigation; 
• differences in interests between countries in mitigating climate change; 
• definition of equity; and  
• burden sharing of mitigation and adaptation costs. 
A next question was about what information is most needed for elaborating Article 2. 
This question resulted in a long list of information needs:  
• Information to define valid and workable indicators for assessing local/regional vul-
nerability and adaptive capacity; 
• Information to define target-loads (e.g. % percent at high risk of X or Y; compare 
critical loads for acidification); 
• More information/confidence about levels of risks from climate change at the re-
gional level in relation to various concentration stabilisation scenarios; 
• More information about changes in risks from extreme events; 
• More information on critical thresholds for irreversible systems change; 
• More information about the CC risks and value of losses in ecosystem functions; 
• Methodologies to factor out (anthropogenic) CC stress component of impacted cate-
gories (e.g. food production); 
• More information about the “real” socio-economic costs of significant reductions of 
GHGs (not just economic modelling); 
• More social science information (e.g. on risk perceptions and social tolerances), and  
• Integrated inverse impacts analysis (from critical stress levels to likelihood of ex-
ceeding these for various emission levels (including subjective assessment of levels 
of confidence). 
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Finally, people were asked what issues they considered important to discuss during a 
first dialogue workshop. This resulted in a broad list of issues. Some issues related to the 
contents of the dialogue, such as: 
• whether Art. 2 is a useful starting point for defining long-term climate policy objec-
tives; 
• how to clarify what constitutes “dangerous climate change”; 
• how to define (practical and realistic) criteria for dangerous levels of climate change 
risks; 
• the role of justice in determining dangerous climate change risks; 
• the possibilities of science to help define relevant and usable indicators; 
• what levels of adaptation are feasible and acceptable; 
• how risk theories can help in understanding Art.2; 
• appropriate ways to make Art. 2 more meaningful for discussing post-Kyoto poli-
cies. 
Some other issues mentioned were related to the design and the process of the dialogue: 
• how to involve all relevant stakeholders (including indigenous peoples); 
• how to account for regional differences in global dialogue; 
• what to expect from the dialogue (content, status, role in policy process).  
Someone suggested using the workshop to develop a road map for a process to reach 
agreement. 
Finally, some remarkable general observations regarding the results from the question-
naire were made: 
• there is no distinct difference in the responses from policy makers and scientists. 
This may be explained by the fact that many policy makers have a scientific back-
ground and scientific advisors; 
• there is a large number of people that consider Art. 2 not to be properly formulated, 
as its language is ambiguous and the conditions mentioned not sufficiently inclusive. 
Nevertheless operationalising the Article is considered important.  
2.2 Some participants views on Article 2 
The first speaker was from the NGO community. He stated that in his view the timing 
was right for a discussion on Article 2. Long-term goals are needed to limit the damage 
that is already taking place, since the earth was already committed to a certain amount of 
damage and many communities and species were already suffering from the conse-
quences. The question is thus not if, but how many ecosystems are going to be damaged. 
He explained that the Climate Action Network (CAN) had recently presented a docu-
ment saying that the maximum acceptable temperature limit was 2 degree Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels. He emphasised that this position was not taken because this level 
was considered safe, but because it was considered already very ambitious to reach. It 
implies that the global community needs to become engaged in a rapid de-carbonisation 
process starting now in order to limit global concentrations to below 450 ppmv. Key de-
veloping countries will have to start reducing their emissions by no later than 2020/2025. 
Annex I countries would have to reduce their emissions by 60-80% by the middle of the 
next century. Climate mitigation was the only emergency exit available. Rapid decoup-
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ling of emissions from income would also lead to a fundamental change in land-use poli-
cies. An important question for the dialogue is how to deal with adaptation. There is a 
risk that adaptation policies hamper mitigation action, while there are serious limits to 
adaptation. The main focus of climate policies should therefore remain with preventive 
action. He also highlighted that the 2-degree target was far from adequate to save some 
vulnerable regions of the world from the impacts of climate change. The impacts could 
already be seen in the Arctic ice sheet.  
A dialogue on Article 2 was an important starting point. But who should be the partici-
pants in such a dialogue? He felt that the group present would probably be able to come 
to some common position on Art. 2. It would be necessary to broaden the debate to soci-
ety at large. In particular, it would be necessary to involve those in the dialogue that 
make key investment decisions: the ministries involved in economic planning and par-
ticipating in the development agenda, and industry. While developing countries are the 
most vulnerable to climate change, the issue is not on their policy agenda. Industry also 
should be involved. It is in their self-interest to have targets for the longer term, and they 
need to start realising that Kyoto is just the beginning. At the same time, he noticed that 
in the environmental NGO community at large climate change was losing importance. 
Not because it is not considered an important issue, but because of the difficulty of deal-
ing with a remote problem (problem for the future, for far-away countries), making it far 
more difficult to communicate it to the general public.  
The second invited speaker - a policy maker - then presented his views. He said instead 
of focusing on the fact that the water is boiling slowly in the frog anecdote, we needed to 
focus more on the cases where the water was boiling quickly - such as the Greenland ice 
sheet. It is particularly the possible major non-linear climate changes that we need to 
worry about. In this respect it will be better to agree on a high target than no target at all. 
However, in his view instead of a top-down analysis it would make more sense to start 
from a reverse risk analysis, where possible risks and thresholds are identified first and 
then related to concentrations and emissions. At the same time, it is clear that even at 
concentrations as low as 550 ppmv the Greenland ice sheet will begin to melt, ecosys-
tems will disappear and some countries will disappear. Thus, there is also a need to think 
in terms of potential compensation mechanisms for the casualties. He made an analogy 
with transport risks, saying that people willingly undertook such risks and were willing 
to bear the consequences. Saying that car driving is dangerous is not helpful in coping 
with the risks. It was very important in any case to begin to focus on end targets to send 
clear signals. The Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion is a clear case of how long-term 
targets can work well in providing industry clear signals. Such targets can also help the 
discussion on burden sharing. He agreed with the first speaker that the room was full of 
only people that possibly were a coalition of the willing and many outside would need to 
be involves as well. 
In response to the presentations, a participant noticed that the decreasing interest of 
NGOs for climate change was not necessarily experienced in central and eastern Euro-
pean countries. These NGOs had less money but were far more focused on these issues. 
There the key bottleneck is the language barrier. There was an offer made to send out the 
questionnaires in other languages in the Annex I countries. 
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2.3 Plenary discussion (1) 
The foregoing led to a number of points of discussion and questions: 
A technical question related to the issue of the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. It was 
asked if a 550 ppmv concentration level was only consistent with a 2 degree global 
warming and if this could lead to the melting of the ice sheet? The answer was that if this 
2 degree warming was consistent with a 3 degree warming in Greenland - yes; and mod-
els seemed to indicate that this was likely. 
One participant wondered if instead of the boiling water, the focus should not be much 
more on the behaviour of the frog itself i.e. what the man on the street thinks? This is be-
cause policymakers only listen to scientists when the public agrees with the scientists. 
Thus, there is a need for more scientific information about the change in perceptions and 
behaviour of people in response to information on climate change (in all countries). 
Somebody considered this as possibly problematic, because the public would have to 
understand climate change issue first and this is what makes the issue so difficult. How-
ever, others agreed that the frog needed more attention and that social sciences may be 
very useful in providing this information. 
It was noted that in some communities it would not be necessary to address the climate 
change problem by developing long-term targets. In the US the response to traffic casu-
alties was not to set any targets, but to implement a technology-oriented approach. A 
technology-based approach could serve the purpose just as well. Thus, it would be nec-
essary to broaden the debate on dealing with climate change to various approaches to en-
sure that it does not become irrelevant for some communities. It was also remarked that 
in order to appeal to financial ministers it would be necessary not only to talk about 
risks, but also about costs and benefits. A finance minister is unlikely to support a strin-
gent target if the costs are high and the benefits unclear. This caused some discussion as 
here participant’s views clearly differed. Some agreed that Article 2 includes the balanc-
ing of the costs of mitigating measures with the benefits of avoiding risks. Others held 
the view that one should keep separate what constitutes dangerous climate change and 
whether the measures to deal with it are affordable. They preferred to move more to-
wards a cost-effectiveness debate. It was pointed out that costs had been no big issue in 
the case of the Montreal Protocol; when the scientist were clear about the need for ac-
tion, policy and business followed suit. Some held the view that the reference to sustain-
able development in Art. 2 meant that the issue should be interpreted beyond the narrow 
context of just economic costs. One did not need to go down to the level of the finance 
minister and speak his language; one needed to educate the finance minister on sustain-
able development. Another argument was that if you were vulnerable to climate change 
you wanted to know what is dangerous and not that dangerous was defined on the basis 
of what was considered affordable by some scientific methodology. Others went on to 
say that there was remarkably little literature on avoidable dangers. The problem with 
the frog anecdote was that it gave the impression that the water was boiling slowly; but 
in fact there is no linear progression in the climate change. And even if the earth is 
warming slowly, any thresholds were being crossed regularly for specific species in spe-
cific areas such as the frog itself! Even at 450ppmv CO2 concentration it is impossible to 
ensure that sea level rise stops at 1 metre. A 450 CO2 ppmv or a 550 ppmv for all gases 
is consistent with the Greenland ice sheet problem; that is a major problem, not one that 
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can be evaluated in financial terms. All this made one speaker question whether the hu-
man race was psychologically able to deal with such a complicated problem - especially 
if there were going to be a number of abrupt changes in the system. He pointed at the 
importance of scientists helping to visualise to the public what may happen under differ-
ent levels of GHG concentrations. Another participant remarked that the problem was 
that the public is only interested in themselves, and would not support any far-reaching 
target if it might endanger sustainable economic growth. Policymakers cannot take deci-
sions that the public will not support. 
Another issue in the discussion was the issue of scale and equity. The problem with cli-
mate change is its asymmetrical nature, with the most vulnerable being the least respon-
sible and visa versa. Regions face different types and levels of problems and different 
thresholds are being crossed. Which threshold is then to be seen as the most relevant 
threshold and at what scale should it be assessed? Some suggested not go down too 
much to the local scale to avoid these insoluble problems; others suggested defining 
critical thresholds for different regions and systems. It was noted that the equity issue not 
only relates to impacts but also to mitigation. Communities in some developed countries 
do not see why they should stop exploiting fossil fuels, when developing countries are 
allowed to continue doing so. This is considered an important issue even though the 
same communities may locally suffer from climate change at the same time. 
Some participants wanted to know why scientists were constraining themselves in the 
debate about defining what is dangerous; was it really a too subjective issue or too politi-
cal for the IPCC? The approach being taken at the workshop appeared to inadequately 
focus on quantification. They stressed the importance of quantification of Article 2 for 
helping the policy process further. Numbers mobilised policymakers. Were there no 
thresholds that could be seen as scientific thresholds? The concept of critical loads from 
the LRTAP regime could be adopted here. It was noted that the very fact that in dealing 
with the issue of thresholds Bob Watson (former Chair of IPCC) in his presentation had 
to use a rhetorical device (“ppmvs - impacts - is this dangerous?”) was a striking illustra-
tion of the fact that the information cannot be delivered in a straight manner. The infor-
mation provided by scientists has muddied the process and there is no clear picture. Are 
scientists constraining themselves, is it a question of the way the IPCC chapters are 
structures, is it because danger is really a subjective issue, or is it because defining dan-
ger in itself is politically complicated and dangerous? Scientists remarked that the scien-
tists had not felt constrained within the IPCC, but that due to the structure of the IPCC 
there had not been a focus on Article 2. Some scientists stressed that it would not be a 
good thing if scientists would be given the responsibility to define what is dangerous. In 
this respect somebody remarked that a distinction should be made between two ways of 
defining ‘dangerous’: (i) in the way scientists do, that is by defining the likelihood of se-
vere damage (risk), and (ii) in a value-loaden common usage way, that is indicating 
when possible outcomes become unacceptable. Scientists should limit themselves to say-
ing what the risks are at various levels of change, not when these become unacceptable. 
This is the approach that IPCC has been taken as illustrated by the synthesis figure indi-
cating the relation between global temperature change and the levels of the various types 
of risks. Someone noted that the problem is that the IPCC reports do not explain what 
can be gained by keeping to lower levels of concentrations, only that costs would go up 
steeply with lower stabilisation levels. The synthesis colouring figure (Figure 1.1) on 
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risks relates to temperature change, not to stabilisation levels. Moreover, there is the 
problem that the scientific literature on impacts at low stabilisation levels is very weak. 
The IPCC-TAR makes clear that above 3-4 degrees temperature increase (from 1990 
levels) overall consequences for all systems become negative. It would already be a ma-
jor step forward if we could agree that we would want to stay away from a 3-4 degrees 
temperature increase. 
One speaker questioned if 2 Article was ever drafted to be made operative in a formal 
quantitative way. He thought its function would probably mainly be to maintain pressure 
on policy makers to take action. Quantification would be difficult. For example, the dif-
ference between gradual and abrupt change is often a matter of scale. The loss of indi-
vidual species already constitutes irreversible and locally abrupt changes. Pressure is 
needed, and should be provided through scientific information. Science can document 
what changes there are in ecosystems and managed systems, and try to derive thresholds. 
If this is put in a graph, the policy makers will be able to use it. This should be done at 
regional (and local) levels. These refined approaches can maintain the pressure. If sci-
ence cannot give an answer, the precautionary principle should apply. 
There were some other problems flagged in setting numbers. Policy makers are often 
confronted with very different figures about the costs of stabilising GHG concentrations. 
In such cases they tend to just split the differences and that can be dangerous. If a stabili-
sation level would be set there would also be a tendency to fill up the emission space 
even though the level chosen might turn out to be too high. It seems questionable that in-
ternational agreement on a stabilisation target can ever be reached when some small is-
land state would have to sign on when their survival is at stake. Perhaps we need to focus 
more on the social instability that climate change impacts may bring to mobilise policy 
makers. 
It was responded that quantification of Article 2 should start from a common sense ap-
proach and focus on debating what climate change risks would be (un)acceptable to the 
public. Someone suggested following also a bottom up approach where policymakers de-
fine what they consider acceptable costs and then relating these to feasible protection 
levels. 
Regarding the question of why industry did not seem interested to participate in the dis-
cussion it was postulated that this is because industry wants to be told what the risks are 
and then define its own future strategy. They do not see themselves as the stewards of 
the earth defining risks for the community. However, it was generally felt that their in-
volvement would be needed in this debate. This is also an issue of educating people: 
business representatives often do not understand the long time-scale involved. 
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3. The structured dialogue 
3.1 Introduction to the structured dialogue4  
The session on the next morning opened with a summary by Joyeeta Gupta of the day 
before and an introduction to the next session. She indicated that yesterday the approach 
taken had been one starting from the different interpretations of Article 2 by stakeholders 
followed by discussing the various arguments for and against these interpretations. This 
was a rather open and unstructured approach. This approach fits in with looking for 
common ground by clustering different positions regarding the interpretation of Article 2 
and searching for areas of agreement by exploring both the reasoning (reality claims and 
line of argumentation) behind the different positions and the underlying value- and belief 
systems involved. She pointed out that today a more structured approach to Article2 
would be followed. First the possible contributions of scientific information would be 
explored. Here Article 2 would be explored from different perspectives: the scientific, 
ecological, economic, development and ethical framework. Next, participants would en-
gage in a reverse risk analysis approach by identifying relevant indicators for defining 
dangerous levels of climate change, that could be used for defining critical thresh-
olds/acceptable risk levels and then be related to greenhouse gas concentrations levels. 
This would be done in outbreak groups.  
3.2 Scientific perspectives on Article 2 - an introduction5  
Alex Haxeltine of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research gave a general intro-
duction on science’s contribution to defining “dangerous interference” with the climate 
system.  
The Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, which emerged 
in October 2002 from the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) reiterates the need to avoid dangerous cli-
mate change as the FCCC’s ultimate objective. According to the Third Assessment Re-
port (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), however, decid-
ing what constitutes dangerous climate change is a value judgement beyond the remit of 
the IPCC and perhaps of science itself.  Indeed, there is no universally established meth-
odology or process for deciding what constitutes a dangerous level of climate change, 
and for whom. Nonetheless, implicitly or explicitly, researchers have suggested arbitrary 
thresholds in climate change, or in the impacts of climate change, which they themselves 
designate as dangerous, undesirable or to be avoided. Some examples of definitions of 
dangerous climate change are: 
Danger measured through threshold in physical vulnerability: 
• Large-scale eradication of coral reef systems (O’Neil and Oppenheimer, 2002); 
                                                   
4  By Joyeeta Gupta, IVM. 
5  By Alex Haxeltime, Tyndale Centre. 
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• Disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002); 
• Breakdown of the thermohaline circulation (Rahmstorf, 2000); 
• Qualitative modification of crucial climate-system patterns such as ENSO and  NAO 
(Timmermann et al., 1999); 
• Climate change exceeding the rate at which biomes can migrate (Malcom and Mark-
ham, 2000). 
Danger measured through threshold in social vulnerability: 
• Irrigation demand exceeding 50 per cent of annual seasonal water usage for agricul-
ture in northern Victoria, Australia (Jones, 2000); 
• Depopulation of sovereign atoll countries (Barnett and Adger, 2003); 
• Additional millions of people at risk from water shortage, malaria, hunger and 
coastal flooding (Parry et al., 2001); 
• Destabilisation of international order by environmental refugees and emergence of 
conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Barnett, 2003); 
• World impacts exceeding a threshold percentage of GDP (Nordhaus and Boyer, 
2000). 
So far most of the scientific research on defining dangerous climate change has focused 
on what we term external definitions of danger. External definitions are 
usually based on risk analysis of system characteristics of the physical or 
social world. Recent work at the Tyndall Centre has emphasised that re-
search on defining dangerous climate change or in developing sustainable 
responses must recognise the central role played by perceptions of danger. 
There are therefore competing perspectives on dangerous climate change, 
what we term ‘external’ and ‘internal’ definitions of risk (see  
Figure 3.1). Internal definitions of danger recognise that to be real, danger has to be ei-
ther experienced or to be perceived – it is the individual or collective experience or per-
ception of insecurity or lack of safety that constitutes the danger. A robust policy re-
sponse must appreciate both external and internal definitions of danger. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Components of external and internal definitions of dangerous climate change. 
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The research process leading to these various definitions of danger has followed two dif-
ferent paradigms. The more frequently followed paradigm utilises what we 
term ‘top-down’ methods. This framework (upper left triangle in  
Figure 3.1) follows an essentially linear approach and quantifies indicators of physical 
vulnerability based on scenarios of future socio-economic change that are used as inputs 
to a series of hierarchical models. These types of assessments typically define danger, ei-
ther globally or locally, in terms of physical measures (e.g. affected crop yield or water 
availability), threats to the continued function of some part of the non-human world, or 
in terms of people at risk or reduction in economic welfare. The scenarios used often as-
sume no adaptation will take place as the danger threshold is approached. Sometimes a 
single adaptation action is assumed and modelled, while a few analyses assume adapta-
tion occurs simply on the basis of rational choice. 
The ‘bottom-up’ approach (as shown by the bottom left triangle in  
Figure 3.1) focuses on the social vulnerability of individuals or groups to both existing 
climate variability and climatic change. This approach tests social and economic theories 
of the determinants of vulnerability across a region or between socio-economic groups, 
leading to social indicators of danger and vulnerability such as poverty, lack of access to 
health or other services, or lack of empowerment. This approach also uses reasoning by 
analogy, i.e., learning from past experience of how communities have coped with ex-
treme events. In contrast to ‘top-down’ methods, recognising adaptive capacity is usually 
implicit in such approaches. 
There are also a few attempts to integrate these two approaches to try to derive a more 
holistic definition of vulnerability for the purposes of adaptation to a chang-
ing climate. While recognising the scientific value and policy relevance of 
these research efforts, all these definitions of danger remain ‘external’ in 
the sense that they are observed or modelled according to judgements of in-
dividual or collectives of scientists. But danger can also be defined in terms 
of insecurity or lack of safety. So, for example, in the context of climate 
change it is the perceived insecurity arising from realised or anticipated im-
pacts associated with changing extreme weather events, and often immedi-
ate threats to life and livelihood, which are of greatest concern to individu-
als or, collectively, to society. This definition of dangerous climate change is 
therefore based on psychological, social, moral, institutional and cultural 
processes that influence perceptions of individuals and societies about what 
constitutes danger. The perceptions of danger are determined by personal 
experience, values, information and trust ( 
Figure 3.1). 
These external and internal definitions of dangerous climate change interact with each 
other. Perceptions of what is dangerous are, to an extent, informed by a 
technical analysis of risk (external definition), for example as provided by 
the IPCC in the form of a state-of-the-art assessment of the science of cli-
mate change. The amount of information, the legitimacy of who gives the in-
formation and the other determinants shown in  
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Figure 3.1, will transform this external definition into perception of what constitutes 
dangerous climate change (internal definition). Information on the risk of an 
individual’s house being flooded or discussion about the widespread col-
lapse of coral reefs, for example, do much to formulate perceptions of dan-
ger. Conversely, societal or individual perceptions of what constitutes dan-
gerous climate change will have an impact on the way it is researched and 
externally defined, hence the arrows between the two definitions in  
Figure 3.1. A further dimension of this analysis is the role of expectations and how ex-
ternal definitions of danger can change individual behaviour. The prediction that an atoll 
country would become effectively uninhabitable through reduced land area and water 
availability, for example, could change behaviour such that resources would be over-
exploited making the uninhabitability more likely and the prediction self-fulfilling. 
These examples show that definitions of dangerous climate change are socially con-
structed and involve deeply reflexive processes made up of the interplay between exter-
nal and internal definitions. Thus climate change science exhibits the classic characteris-
tics of strong uncertainty and of a ‘post-normal’ science in terms of framing and execu-
tion of links to public policy. 
What can be the role of science in defining dangerous climate change? First it is clear 
that no objective definition of dangerous climate change is possible. The concepts of 
danger will always be deeply value laden. Within the scientific community we can char-
acterise three groups of approaches: the ecological approach, the economic approach and 
the ethical approach.  
The ecological approach focuses on the selection of thresholds for ecosystem adaptation. 
It selects key ecological/physical thresholds beyond which impacts are deemed unac-
ceptable. Examples range from rates of biome migration to eradication of coral reef sys-
tems. Such thresholds can provide ‘markers’ for policy. 
The economic approach focuses on welfare impacts or optimisation under climate 
change. It seeks to optimise welfare for costs of damages avoided versus the costs of 
mitigation, but may also provide thresholds by indicating when (net) economic losses 
exceed a threshold of GDP. Ecological scientists and physicists tend to find this ap-
proach problematical, but economic valuations are very attractive to the policy process.  
The ethical approach focuses on issues of equity and justice. It suggests that actually the 
more fundamental issues are to do with values, equity and justice. Examples include the 
analysis of the impacts of climate change on atoll states’ cultures. It leads away from a 
positive approach to defining dangerous climate change and puts emphasis on the deci-
sion making process of defining dangerous climate change. Definitions of ‘danger’ must 
be negotiated by groups of people with very different priorities. Such a dialogue/process 
may be framed by science-based or non-science based frameworks. Such an approach 
also tends to relate to internal definitions of danger as people have different thresholds 
for action/attitudes to risk. 
In conclusion: 
• Defining dangerous climate change must be done within a reflexive science frame-
work that acknowledges that no positive concept of danger exists. 
Report of the Annex I workshop  21
• A distinction can be made between internal and external definitions of dangerous cli-
mate change. This distinction is just a conceptual device – how to relate the two is 
the challenge. However, more research on the internal definitions of danger is 
needed. 
• The ethical approach makes clear the importance of procedural justice in defining 
dangerous climate change. 
• Ecology, Economics and Ethics all should contribute to the dialogue, but this is not 
the same thing as the dialogue taking place within a science-led e.g. risk analysis 
framework. 
After this general introduction, other scientists were provided the opportunity to make 
additional contributions from various perspectives. 
3.3 An economic perspective on Article 2 
Professor Robert Mendelsohn gave a first presentation from an economic perspective. 
He pointed out that climate change policies will inevitably involve a learning process: 
finding out what is happening is difficult, uncertainties are large and to see in the future 
is even more difficult. Whatever limit we would state for greenhouse gas emissions 
would not be a definite limit, because there will be new knowledge and insights.  
In assessing the economic impacts of climate change, for example on agriculture, there 
are two possible methodologies, each with their pros and cons. One approach is experi-
mentation, where insights from the lab (e.g. related to the impacts of temperature change 
on agricultural crops) are extrapolated to the real world. Its strengths are: control of un-
wanted variables and possibility to create new conditions. Its weaknesses: difficulty in 
including adaptation and few cases/sites make it hard to generalise from. Another ap-
proach is cross-section analysis. In this approach insights from real situations elsewhere 
are used to model behaviour under changing conditions. This approach includes adapta-
tion, but does not study the response to new conditions, or the mechanisms behind it and 
offers poor control of unwanted variables. 
These are two ways of figuring out how bad climate change may be. However, it remains 
difficult to determine thresholds for dangerous climate change: often the responses are 
gradual. One problem is that not everybody is in the same game. For cold regions (high 
latitudes) climate change will generally be beneficial for agriculture, while for warmer 
regions, like Southern Europe (middle latitudes) climate change will be beneficial on the 
short-term, but detrimental on the long term, while for tropical regions (low latitudes) the 
situation will only get worse. The distribution of impacts thus makes equity a major is-
sue. However, we should not mix up equity and efficiency. Efficiency relates to what is 
best for the world, while the equity issue relates to how to compensate those worse off.  
Recent cost-benefit analyses indicate that a moderate climate change of up to 3oC could 
be beneficial on a global scale. However, there will be differences between regions. A 
5oC temperature increase could still be beneficial for higher latitudes, but will be very 
negative for low and middle latitudes. This suggests that there are no clear economic rea-
sons for climate change to be stopped at all costs. Mitigation is also not a good tool to 
deal with problems related to an uneven distribution of impacts; for this compensation is 
a cheaper and more adequate solution. 
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3.4 A physical-ecological perspective on Article 2 
Professor Oppenheimer next provided a physical-ecological perspective on Article 2. On 
the physical/biological side there are certain thresholds that could provide guidance in 
defining dangerous climate change, but in many cases they are hard to define. Coral 
reefs come closest to clear thresholds. Regarding the stability of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet (WAIS) and the North-Atlantic Thermoline Circulation (THC) this is less clear, 
because the present models still give too poor results for making precise estimate.  
There is a clear difference between real physical threshold levels and regulatory (policy) 
threshold levels. If you have determined the physical thresholds, there is still a lot of 
variability in the climate system requiring including a substantial margin in defining 
regulatory (policy) thresholds. Even then there will remain uncertainty about the actual 
behaviour of systems. Thus uncertainty about the physical thresholds is no reason for not 
setting (provisional) regulatory thresholds. 
There is a tendency to think in terms of temperature instead of concentration targets. He 
doubts that this is a good thing, because temperature change is not a good indicator for 
all impacts (e.g. run-off, frequency of extreme events). The impacts are regional and 
temperature is more variable than concentration levels.  
There are serious limitations in adapting to climate change. Adaptation will not take 
place in an informed rational, but rather chaotic way. It will be based on private rather 
than on a collective response and not always be beneficial. It has to be planned well. 
3.5 An equity perspective on Article 2 
Dr. Jon Barnett set out some equity issues. He started with emphasising that the dialogue 
should make participants reflect on the values involved in defining acceptable and unac-
ceptable climate change impacts. He suggested that participants probably had come be-
cause they feel that climate change is a problem that affects values that they care about. 
To avoid the mistake of limiting the discussions to the technical properties of elaborating 
Article 2 he pointed out that a distinction must be made between why and how we do 
things. Defining danger must be an answer to the why instead of the how question. The 
starting point should be: “I think CC is a problem, because….”, and to then say what is 
(un)acceptable. Art. 2 is the moral test to say what is wrong, which is a political deci-
sion. In his view last night’s discussions had focused too much on the ‘how’ question 
only.  
It is misleading to say that climate change is a global problem, because the impacts are 
very unevenly distributed. The rich countries, while responsible for most carbon emis-
sions, have a high adaptive capacity go limit the impacts of climate change. In contracts, 
the poor countries are much more vulnerable because they are ecologically more sensi-
tive, economically more dependent on primary products, and have a low adaptive capac-
ity. This makes the justice issue a crucial element in the discussion on Article 2. In look-
ing for climate policy targets a justice approach would start with identifying those who 
are most vulnerable, and considering their adaptive capacity in defining thresholds. 
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3.6 Plenary discussion (2) 
The scientific contributions, in particular the one on the economic perspective, resulted 
in a heated discussion. A number of participants felt that the cost-benefit perspective and 
the conclusion that limited climate change could be overall beneficial on a global scale 
was misleading and incorrect. Also the idea that compensation to those less well off 
would be economically a more rational strategy was debated. Compensation was not 
considered better than mitigation for a number of reasons. While the idea of compensa-
tion was considered interesting because it meant holding the polluter accountable, it was 
strongly doubted that in reality compensation would ever be paid. It was also pointed out 
that politically more than just economic considerations count. GDP was not considered a 
valid metric for evaluating all impacts. While a warming of higher latitudes may in some 
cases be economically beneficial by improving agricultural conditions and opening up 
sea routes, it at the same time would result into the disruption of indigenous cultures. 
Social and ethical issues should thus be taken into account as well. Moreover, the pre-
sented figures were questioned. It was argued that economists usually ignore the co-
benefits of mitigation and overestimate the costs. The estimated impacts of climate 
change can be much less beneficial or more negative if based on stochastic changes in 
climate variability instead of projected gradual changes in average values. In response, it 
was acknowledged that the distribution of non-market impacts could be uneven and that 
compensation would not in all cases be satisfactory. However, event though the figures 
presented are rather uncertain, the general message remained that from an economic 
point of view a mild climate change (up to a few degrees temperature increase) was 
likely to be beneficial on a global scale.  
3.7 Group sessions 
After the break the group was split up into two groups to explore possible indicators for 
identifying dangerous levels of climate change. The first group focused on indicators for 
impacts on ecosystems/and non-linear changes in the climate system. The second group 
focused on impacts on human systems. After the break out sessions the results were re-
ported back and discussed in the plenary. 
3.7.1 Indicators for impacts on ecosystems/non-linearities in the climate 
system – results from Working group I 
In the first Working Group on indicators for impacts on ecosystems/non-linearities in the 
climate system a number of issues were discussed. 
• Input variables (e.g. temperature and sea level), and output variables (e.g. species, 
habitat);  
• Look at the ecological effects of CC; 
• How much area loss is acceptable (10, 20, 50%?);  
• Net Ecosystem Production (NEP) is better measurable than Net Primary Production 
(NPP), which says nothing about the carbon flux; 
• Ecosystems change even without CC. It is difficult to separate CC from other factors 
(attribution problem); 
• A distinction must be made between criteria and impacts. Now the criteria are a mix; 
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• Models are underestimating effects of CC. So there is a need to look at large and 
small scale changes to see how/if the climate is changing; 
• The group identified a number of criteria for indicators: 
• Indicators should be measurable and/or modelling should be possible; 
• It should be clear what level could be considered dangerous; 
• changes in the value of the indicators should be attributable to climate change;  
• they should have appeal to the public. 
 
 
  
This discussion led to the following outcome: 
 Table 3.1 Outcomes Breakout Group 1. 
Criteria considered most relevant Scale Quantification 
NEP loss, including disturbances Regional and global ∆ NEP over time, until it 
becomes negative 
1. Habitat loss 
 
2. Species loss 
 
 
 
 
3. Species health 
1. Regional 
 
2. Regional and 
global 
 
 
 
 
3. Regional and 
global 
1. Loss of areas with high 
number of endemic species 
2.a) Loss of charismatic 
flagship species (polar bear, 
etc.) 
2. b) Loss of keystone spe-
cies 
3. Frequency of coral 
bleaching 
Sea level Regional - Net sea level rise 
- (Amount of submerged 
land) 
Ocean circulation Regional and global  
Water cycle change and run-off Regional - Frequency of flooding 
- Summer run-off 
- Rainfall pattern 
- Frequency of droughts 
- Extreme precipitation 
events 
Cryosphere stability Regional and global - Regional glacier loss 
- Ice sheet stability 
Precipitation/Intensification/Extreme 
events 
Regional - Frequency of storms 
- Frequency of surges 
- Intensity 
Criteria considered less significant   
Pests   
Ecosystem nutrient state   
Habitat fragmentation/Ecosystem adapta-
bility 
  
Phenology  Regional   
Rate of climate change   
Structural ecosystem change   
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Temperature   
Biodiversity    
 
3.7.2 Indicators for impacts on human systems – results from Working 
Group 2 
In Working Group 2, indicators for the impacts on human systems were discussed. Dis-
cussion points included: 
• Food production or food security in vulnerable regions (like Horn of Africa) as crite-
ria (if there is a difference between the two). Food security is not as good as food 
production in defining dangerous situations at the local level. While the problem is 
not the production of food but the problem is the distribution of food, food produc-
tion (at the local and regional scale) is probably the most relevant and workable indi-
cator of CC impacts on social systems. 
• Another criterion can be the impact on indigenous people. This is related to the food 
production issue as local food production often affects the possibilities of preserving 
cultures.  
• Criteria have to be attributed to CC. Food indicators are best attributable to CC, mi-
gration is too complex to be attributed to CC. Although attribution is a problem in 
general, in some areas (e.g. Arctic areas), the impacts are very attributable. Attribu-
tion might also not be a problem in areas where e.g. droughts have been common for 
several decades. To deal with the uncertainty in attribution one could use probabilis-
tic methods or use the IPCC-TAR ranges (high/medium/low). 
• The level of aggregation. Policy makers are interested in 3 types of levels (if it can 
be attributed to CC) 
• A distinction can be made between different types of indicators / threshold levels 
with different functions: observable (early) warning level indicators (e.g. malaria in 
France) to raise public awareness; maximum acceptable levels of CC to use for tar-
get-setting, and no-go area indicators, indication events or levels to avoid (red alert 
levels, e.g. no food production). We first need the warning level indicators. Indica-
tors for the last need to be very predictable. The middle ones we have to be quite 
confident on. Such indicators could be not need to serve all levels of scale. 
• Some indicators, like food production are rather slow indicators. It may be useful to 
look at underlying factors that are providing more early warnings. 
• For policy makers it is important that the indicators are very clear and not confusing.  
• An important question is how to deal with adaptation. How can you account for vari-
ous options for adaptation measures? Adaptation is in principle frozen for this exer-
cise. This is difficult assumption, though, because adaptation is very important in de-
termining what is dangerous (impacts could be easy to adapt to). So indicators have 
to include indications of adaptation.  
• Another thing that has to be taken into account is a risk analysis. What is the range of 
the risks? What is the likelihood of the impacts being triggered? 
• Different criteria for indicators were identified. Indicators should be:  
• measurable;  
• predictable/reliable; 
• attributable; 
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• transparent; 
• have public appeal. 
• Apart from local and regional indicators there is a need for aggregated indicators, or 
methods on how to aggregate. These could be based on the amount of people or area 
severely affected. What would be considered severely could then be decided upon at 
a later stage. This approach works well in the area of noise pollution and seems in-
teresting to explore in the case of climate change. 
 
The discussions resulted into two tables, with the first being integrated in the second. 
Table 3.1 Outcomes (1) Breakout Group 2. 
Important criteria Scale Quantification 
Food production: 
- Food shortage 
- Distribution 
- Self sufficiency 
- Crop migration 
  
Health: 
- Illnesses (insect-born diseases) 
 
  
Water 
- Freshwater availability 
- Water quality 
- Water shortage 
  
Population displacement/Refugees: 
- Internal 
- External 
  
Loss of culture   
Economic losses   
Ecological services: 
- loss of forests  
Regional   
Other criteria:   
Final energy consumption   
Extreme events   
Transboundary air pollution   
Persistent Organic Pollutants   
GDP   
Human Development Index (HDI)   
Life expectancy   
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Table 3.2 Outcomes (2) Breakout Group 2 
Art. 2  
categories 
Criteria How to  
measure? 
(*1,2,3,4) 
Criteria for  
criteria 
(*5,6,7,8,9) 
Threshold levels 
(*10,11,12) 
Food Food    
 Extreme events    
 Infestation (pests)    
 Water    
Ecosystem Ecological services    
 Extreme events    
Development Health    
 Loss of culture    
 Extreme events    
 Displacement    
 GDP    
 Livelihoods    
 Coastal flooding    
 Notes Table 3.2 
 
*1,2,3,4: Indicators of measuring impacts: 
1. Number of people seriously affected 
2. Income effects/Damages 
3. HDI 
4. Built environment 
*5,6,7,8,9: Criteria for determining appropriateness of criteria: 
5. Measurable 
6. Predictable/Reliable 
7. Attributable 
8. Transparent 
9. Public appeal 
*10,11,12:  Different threshold levels:  
10. Early warning levels 
11. Maximum acceptable levels 
12. No-go levels 
3.8 Plenary discussion (3) 
Generally, there seemed quite some agreement about the criteria for indicators to be se-
lected. At the same time the discussion indicated that there are a number of difficult is-
sues in identifying suitable indicators and indicator levels.  
• How to take adaptation into account? This is particular of importance for the risks to 
human systems. What levels of adaptation can be expected and would be acceptable 
in setting target levels for indicators? 
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• Risk perspective. Many indicators are related to climate variability. This implies that 
a risk approach will be needed. Risk analysis should provide information about the 
likelihood of indicator levels to be exceeded. 
• Attribution. Many indicators relate to events that are not only related to climate 
change, thus making it complicated to attribute impacts to climate change. 
• Level of aggregation. What is the most proper level of aggregation for indicators to 
be significant, representative, transparent etc. 
• Public appeal. There may be a pay-off between scientifically most credible indicators 
and those apprehensible to the general public. 
It was noted that the attribution aspect becomes easier to handle when indicators are 
model-based outcomes. In any case the credibility of an indicator to the public will be 
very important. The suggested distinction between early warning, policy indicators and 
no-go area indicators could be very helpful in this respect. Each set serves different pur-
poses. Early warning indicators may be very important for raising public awareness and 
support by indicating that there is significant change, but need not necessarily to be 
pointing at dangerous levels yet. Policy indicators will have to be based on model-based 
predictive indicators that may have less public appeal but can be related to (long-term) 
policy targets. Regarding the problem of attribution it was noted that this is less a prob-
lem in the case of early warning indicators: you don’t need to attribute the increase in in-
surance costs due to extreme weather events to climate change to make clear that things 
are going in the wrong direction. Someone suggested dealing with the attribution issue in 
the way IPCC deals with climate impacts: by indicating levels of confidence. It makes no 
sense to look for perfect approaches. One could also think of probabilistic early warning 
indicators: indicating that there is X% chance that there is a significant change in for ex-
ample precipitation (related to climate change). 
Regarding the issue of aggregation it was remarked that we both need single and aggre-
gated indicators. Marginal indicators (like the loss of key species or cultures) cannot be 
aggregated, while aggregated indicators can help making the attribution case stronger. 
However, in the case of economic aggregations - like in cost-benefit analysis - it was 
considered important that the way things are being aggregated remains transparent. 
From the reporting of the subgroups no fundamental different perspectives in the sub-
groups appeared. This might be related to the fact that the groups did not really have to 
prioritise or to agree on setting specific indicators threshold levels. In subgroup 1 the is-
sue of substitutability regarding ecosystems loss did arise. 
3.9 General discussion on approaches and indicators for 
operationalising Article 2 
In a final discussion session the debate was broadened again to both issues of impacts, 
adaptation and mitigation. A central question was when Climate Change policies would 
be considered sustainable or unsustainable.  
Sustainability criteria for climate change policies 
It was noted (again) that Article 2 is ambiguous about sustainable development. It can be 
interpreted as both sustainable development as well as sustained economic growth. From 
the first perspective, safeguarding sustained economic growth would not be justified 
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since the present fossil-based economic system is not sustainable. It was remarked, how-
ever, that while shutting down fossil power plants might be sustainable, it would not be 
realistic. Others argued that the alternatives might not be considered sustainable either, 
like nuclear, large-scale hydro and biomass plantations (competition for land). Moreover, 
it would result in large income losses for fossil energy exporters, well beyond levels re-
sulting from market fluctuations that might be still be considered acceptable. This raised 
a discussion on what mitigation policies would not be considered sustainable. One par-
ticipant indicated that in his view policy options with unforeseeable and irreversible im-
plications like geo-engineering or CO2 storage in oceans, and policies stopping the tran-
sition to renewables would not be sustainable. Another participant held the view that 
climate change policies should not hinder the ordinary lives of people, either legally (re-
stricting the freedom of behaviour) or economically (making things to expensive). Ulti-
mately policies will be steered not by what is sustainable but by what is acceptable. 
Some participants stressed that the investment costs for mitigating climate change are no 
real problem and will pay themselves back, particularly when ancillary benefits are ac-
counted for. A key criterion would be to keep the prices of energy services affordable, 
particular in developing countries, because then economic development would not be 
impeded. Some participants mentioned that climate policies also should not result into 
high regional concentrations of unemployment, e.g. due to a too fast reduction of fossil 
subsidies or shutting down of coalmines or other fossil intensive activities. There should 
be sufficient time for restructuring economies. Finally, it was remarked that international 
climate policies should prevent too high levels of carbon leakage to (developing) coun-
tries without commitments as that would make polices ineffective and result in unneces-
sary costs. In response, another participant noted that stringent polices in developed 
countries could result in substantial technological spill over reducing the emission inten-
sities of developing countries economies. 
Interestingly, economic loss - in terms of GDP growth foregone - was not mentioned. It 
was noted that costs are only relevant in relation to the benefits or risks perceived. More-
over, the key question is costs for whom rather than overall GDP loss. Social indicators 
of climate policy impacts take this better into account. With respect to the burden sharing 
the proportionality principle seems very important. 
Balancing risks and costs 
How could the risks of climate change be balanced against the costs of climate policies? 
One participant thinks that it will be difficult to balance risks and costs in a formalised 
way within the UNFCCC. Such a process is complicated by differences in the sensitivi-
ties of various natural and social systems and in regional vulnerabilities. It seems 
unlikely that a quantitative assessment of Article 2 will be part of the negotiation proc-
ess. For example: small island states could not accept any targets that would compromise 
their very existence! Scientific information about risks and costs will be processed by the 
IPCC, and that information will then help in putting pressure on the policy process to 
act. One of the participants does not agree. He thinks that long-term policy targets will 
be needed to guide the negotiation process on short-term policy decisions. A too strict 
and formal approach for trading off risks and costs - like cost-benefit analysis - would be 
unwise, but an open assessment within the UNFCCC process would be valuable in order 
to build consensus on restrict the range of acceptable long-term options. Another partici-
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pant fears that such a balancing will be hampered by major scientific uncertainties, in 
particular regarding possible breaking points in systems responses. However, he feels 
that options for long-term climate goals should be left open. One scientist points out that 
based on present scientific knowledge a formal CBA may indicate that we do not yet 
need to do a lot. Another scientist points out that the outcomes are likely to be quite the 
opposite if large-scale non-linear climate system changes are accounted for – even if 
only a low probability is attached to them. Others also feel that CBA does not provide a 
politically realistic approach for balancing risks and costs of climate change policies. It 
ignores too much the re-distribution and ethical issues that will be central to policy mak-
ing. CBA is not well suited to deal with climate change because of the many different 
metrics involved, many of which are hard to be monetised. Many participants feel that 
there will be a need for multiple approaches and metrics. Transparency will be very im-
portant to make all information assessable. The issue of how to manage distributional ef-
fects of climate change and climate change policies needs much more debate.  
 
Report of the Annex I workshop  31
4. Evaluation of the workshop and the lessons for the 
global dialogue 
4.1 Evaluation of the workshop 
The last session of the workshop was devoted to evaluating the workshop and gathering 
ideas for designing the global dialogue. In addition to the plenary evaluation information 
was also gathered via an anonymous evaluation questionnaire at the end of the meeting. 
4.1.1 Results from the plenary evaluation 
Regarding the contents of the meeting it was generally felt that it had been good to bring 
different political and scientific perspectives together. This had resulted in a lively de-
bate and helped in the sharpening of arguments. However, it was suggested to involve 
more scientists from more diverse disciplines next time (e.g. from social sciences). There 
was also a feeling of confusion about the outcomes of the workshop. Partly, this was re-
lated to the complexity of the issue, but also due to some lack of clarity about the subject 
of the project itself. Did the project intend to talk about the interpretation of Art. 2 (in a 
narrow sense) or about the broader debate about long-term climate targets and strategies? 
The dialogue itself was generally well appreciated, in particularly the one on indicators. 
It was noted that there was a need to better distinguish between indicators and long-term 
targets. The discussions on indicators had been mainly on the selection of indicators; 
some had hoped it would have been more about critical/acceptable levels as well. At the 
same time, it was felt that there was (still) a lack of solid ground for setting levels for in-
dicators.  
With respect to the dialogue itself, the participants were positive about the group of peo-
ple gathered at the workshop. They considered it a good mix of well-informed and rele-
vant policy makers, stakeholders and scientists. However, the group was not considered 
diverse enough: there was too much consensus and important stakeholders were missing 
(business, economic ministries, indigenous groups). The interaction between scientists 
and policy makers was viewed as very positive. The debate itself had been open and con-
structive, without reiterations of positions. However, some felt that the discussions 
sometimes were too broad and could have gained from a clearer definition of envisaged 
outcomes and more structured moderation.  
4.1.2 Results from the evaluation questionnaire 
Generally, the results from the questionnaire confirm the expressed high appreciation of 
the participants of the workshop, but also contained some more critical remarks about 
the process. Most participants rated the workshop ‘good’, some ‘very good’ and no one 
as reasonable, poor or bad. The workshop also met most participants’ expectations, al-
though some indicated to have expected to talk more about economic and political as-
pects (barriers, (un)acceptable levels of climate change impacts). All participants very 
much enjoyed the open and constructive atmosphere that was experienced as stimulating. 
At the same time, they experienced that the complexity of the issue requires much more 
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time for elaboration and a proper structuring of the discussions. Some participants indi-
cated that the goals, set up and envisaged outcomes of the meeting could have been 
made clearer. The structure of the meeting did not always seem to be clear to all partici-
pants. Nevertheless, all sessions of the programme were well appreciated, in particular 
on contents and the moderation. Time availability generally got a lower rating. 
The session on stakeholders’ views went very well, although the discussion sometimes 
lost its focus and could have been more structured. Regarding the session on the role of 
science the responses indicated that participants differed in their reception of the presen-
tations. Some were positive about the social science input, while others had rather ex-
pected a systematic overview of the state of science to help quantifying indicators for 
dangerous climate change. The economic presentation was received by some as too con-
troversial and one-sided and some would have preferred alternative perspectives. The re-
sults of the questionnaires on the two breakout sessions indicate a clear difference in ap-
preciation. The group on impacts on human systems had more difficulty in structuring 
the discussion and the identification of proper indicators than the group on climate and 
ecosystems impacts. This seems reflected in the appreciation of both contents and mod-
eration of the session. Nevertheless the breakout sessions were still much appreciated for 
helping making discussions on Article 2 more concrete and clarifying positions. How-
ever, the time available was generally considered insufficient to reach an adequate level 
of depth and reflection. The session on balancing risks and interests focusing more on 
the sustainability of climate policy responses also received somewhat mixed responses. 
Some considered the discussion less relevant or too general. For some, the relationship 
with Art. 2 was not clear enough. Some of the confusion seemed related to the ambiguity 
in the wording of Art. 2 (particularly related to the interpretation of sustainable economic 
growth) and the mixing of the criterion of sustainability and that of acceptability. The fi-
nal session on the follow up of the workshop and design of the global dialogue was 
rather short but well appreciated (by those still attending). It was felt that a follow up 
would be very valuable and that good suggestions were made. 
Regarding the outcomes of the workshop most respondents indicated that they gained a 
better understanding of the views of other participants and learned that views are quite 
diverse. Many participants also indicated that the workshop had produced new ideas or 
insights. Some indicated that while there may be no new ideas, the workshop had helped 
in clarifying positions and arguments or deepened their understanding of the issue. How-
ever, only few indicated that the workshop had actually changed their views on Article 2. 
People indicated that it made them more aware of the ambiguity of the language of the 
Article, its relevance for driving the negotiations and communicating climate change to 
the general public, the inherent difficulties of valuation and aggregation, and the limited 
value of quantitative approaches (cost-benefit analysis) for policy evaluation. 
Overall, many felt that the workshop was a good starting point and some indicated that 
they had gained ideas on how to bring the debate forward. At the same time, it was also 
clear that much more elaboration and discussion would be needed. Notwithstanding dif-
ferences in views, it was felt that the group was still rather homogeneous. It was realised 
that the (global) dialogue would become much more difficult when other relevant stake-
holders and developing countries would be involved, and if real choices (e.g. on indica-
tors to be selected /prioritised and (un)acceptable indicator values) would have to be 
made.  
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The satisfaction of the participants about the workshop was reflected in the enthusiasm 
for participation in a global dialogue. All respondents indicated their interest to getting 
involved in the global dialogue. 
4.2 Recommendations for the global dialogue 
From the plenary evaluation and the questionnaires a number of recommendations for 
the global dialogue can be derived.  
• Go ahead with the HOT dialogue. It was generally recommended to continue the 
HOT dialogue as it was viewed as very important and useful in supporting thinking 
about post-Kyoto policies.  
• Diversify the group of participants. To make the dialogue more valuable and relevant 
the stakeholder participation should be widened: involve other ministries (like eco-
nomic affairs and transport), business, local governments and indigenous groups.  
• Keep away from the negotiations. Some stressed the importance of keeping the proc-
ess far away from the formal negotiation process to preserve the constructive atmos-
phere. A suggestion was made to frame the global dialogue more in the context of 
sustainable development to avoid deadlocks due to debate between Annex I and non-
Annex I on future commitments.  
• Enhance the interaction with science. A continued involvement of scientist was 
highly recommended. Some suggested a stronger interaction with scientists, possibly 
by involving modelling teams to support the dialogue with analysis of policy options 
and by making the interaction with the science iterative. Other suggestions were to 
have more systematic scientific input; provide more comprehensive introductions to 
align participants’ minds; and produce background papers for specific topics and 
clearer inputs for policy makers. 
• Provide more information for defining acceptable levels. Next time, more informa-
tion should be provided to help defining acceptable levels for indicators. The infor-
mation provided should cover a broader range of effects, provide more specific in-
formation about risks to differentiate regions, groups and systems, and include alter-
native scientific perspectives (e.g. on economics). 
• Elaborate on the workshop results. It was suggested to further elaborate on the work-
shop’s outcomes related to the selection of indicators.  
• Provide more clarity and structure. Given the complexity of the issue it was sug-
gested to provide more clarity about envisaged outcomes and tasks, have more struc-
tured/focussed discussions and provide more intensive moderation.  
• Take more time. There should be more time for discussion and the elaboration of 
ideas.  
• Smaller breakout groups. Breakout groups are a good idea but keep them small.  
• Create room for stakeholder’s input. It was suggested to allow for stakeholders to 
provide their input to the debate, such as stakeholders from indigenous communities 
or industry.  
Make a roadmap. It was suggested to work out a road map for how the dialogue would 
feed in to the negotiation process. 
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12. Mr. Matt JONES    CAN 
13. Ms. Jan CORFEE-MORLOT  FA 
14. Mr. Bill HARE    DE 
15. Mr. Alex HAXELTINE   UK 
16. Mr. Michael OPPENHEIMER  USA 
17. Mr. Jonathan BARNETT   NZ 
18. Mr. Rik LEEMANS   NL 
19. Mr. David WARRILOW   UK 
20. Mr. Robert MENDELSOHN  USA 
21. Mr. Enno HARDERS   DE 
22. Mr. Paul CURNOW   AUS 
23. Mr. Donald GOLDBERG   US 
24. Mr. Rolf SARTORIUS   DE 
25. Mr. Andre KRANJC   Slov 
26. Ms. Jackie JONES    UK 
27. Mr. Per ROSENQVIST   SE 
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Appendix II. Workshop Programme 
Monday 2nd June 
16.30 – 17.00  Reception 
17.00 – 17.15  Welcome (Dr. Joyeeta Gupta, IVM) 
17.15 – 17.30   Introduction to the HOT project / workshop (Dr. Bert Metz, 
RIVM) 
Part 1. What do we mean with dangerous interference?  
17.30 – 18.00   Results from the HOT survey on interpreting Article 2 (Mr. 
Marcel Berk, RIVM)  
Refreshments 
18.15 – 20.00  Stakeholders views on interpreting Article 2  
(10 min per selected attendant) + Discussion  
Workshop Dinner 
 
Tuesday 3rd June 
Part 2.   What can Science say about defining “dangerous  
interference”? 
09.00 – 09.10  Introduction to today’s agenda (Dr. J Gupta)  
09.10 – 10.15  Presentation of scientific insights regarding the implications of 
interfering with the climate system 
   - General introduction (Dr. Alex Haxeltine, The Tyndall Centre) 
   - Additional contributions from other scientists 
Discussion 
Coffee break  
Part 3.    How to define “dangerous” climate change related impacts? 
10.30 – 12.00  Discussion in 2 breakout on elaborating different dimensions of 
“dangerous” climate change related impacts: 
• What are the relevant indicators for defining ‘dangerous interference’ from 
the impact perspective?  What is the appropriate level of scale? 
• What level of adaptation is feasible and acceptable? 
• What are suitable threshold indicators and critical event levels for defining 
unacceptable climate change related impacts? 
• What level of certainty do we want about the likelihood of avoiding these 
critical incidences? 
• What are our critical information needs? 
12.00 – 13.00 Plenary discussion on the results of the 2 breakout groups. 
Lunch break 
Part 4.  How to balance risks and interests? 
14.00 – 15.00  Discussing the broader scope: approaching “dangerous interfer-
ence” from an integrated perspective including also costs, implementation and equity is-
sues. 
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Part 5.  How to set up a global dialogue on Article 2? 
15.00 – 15.15  Ideas about the design of the second phase of HOT (Dr. J. 
Gupta) 
15.15 – 16.00  Discussion 
16.00 – 16.30   Wrap up and Evaluation 
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Appendix III. Questionnaire Helping operationalise 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant pro-
visions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow eco-
systems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
1.  Do you think that the three conditions in Article 2 (“allow ecosystems to adapt natu-
rally”, “ensure that food production is not threatened” and “enable economic devel-
opment to proceed in a sustainable manner”) can be used to define the level at which 
GHG concentrations will become “dangerous”? Are there other conditions that 
should be taken into account? Is anything (else) missing or inadequate in this Arti-
cle? 
2.  When would you say that the conditions in Article 2 are no longer met? 
3.  At what scale should these conditions be assessed? (e.g. Should all ecosystems be 
able to adapt naturally? Should food production everywhere be safe? Should all 
forms of economic activity be able to develop sustainably?) 
4.  Are the three conditions equally important? How would you prioritise them? 
5.  What (scientific) information would be needed (most) to be able to better evaluate 
the implications of Article 2? 
6.  What consequences / outcomes of climate change policies would you consider to be 
unacceptable? What conditions should climate change policies meet? 
7.  Stabilizing GHG concentrations at any level will involve costs of reducing emissions 
and also costs of adapting to climate change impacts. How should these costs be dis-
tributed? 
8.  What controversies do you expect will arise in discussing Article 2? 
9.  What other policy issues should be considered in interpreting Article 2? 
  international trade (WTO) 
  national security 
  international security 
  international power relations 
  religious or ideological principles 
  cultural differences 
  others (please specify):  
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10. As part of the first phase of the HOT project regional workshops will be convened to 
discuss the agenda and proper process for a global dialogue on Art. 2. What do you con-
sider the most important issues that should be discussed at such a scoping workshop? 
11. Would you be interested in getting involved in the HOT global dialogue?  
Yes    No   
12. Can you identify other people who you feel would be able to provide relevant input 
for this dialogue?  If so, could you please provide contact information that will allow re-
searchers to contact them? 
1) 
2) 
3) 
 
